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Abstract 
Based on empirical methodology, this study is an attempt at providing a 
quality level assessment of the Hungarian judicature. Since the 1990 regime 
change two major justice reforms have taken place aimed at improving the 
quality and efficiency of justice. The reform of 1997 dramatically 
transforming the judicial hierarchy system, court management and the 
procedural framework was carried out under the auspices of EU accession 
and attempted to improve the quality of justice following explicitly 
European examples. In this spirit, a central administrative body was 
established (the National Judicial Council), which played a crucial role in 
the matter of improving the quality of justice. The Orbán Government that 
came to power in 2010 carried out a reform as an EU Member State that 
triggered harsh criticism from international organizations as well as EU 
institutions. With prioritizing quality and efficiency aspects, the elements of 
the reform that brought about objections from those having cause for 
concern about judicial independence were justified by the legislator. The 
question remains which objective was the real one and what role courts 
play in the Hungarian political system that has evolved since 2010. In order 
to find the answer, what is needed is to examine how sound the 
government's allusion is regarding the interest in the improvement of 
quality and efficiency and in what political context the second judicial 
reform took place.  Measuring quality and efficiency and making 
comparisons  to other countries is a weighty endeavor, which can be traced 
back to differences in the justice systems of certain legal systems. In spite of 
methodological difficulties, establishing a diagnosis about the condition of 
the Hungarian judicature will be attempted, which presents an opportunity 
to compare it to the state of the judicature of other EU countries. 
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The main objective of maintaining the judicial system lies in the final adjudication of disputes 
and bringing violators of the law to justice. A democratic state governed by the rule of law is 
expected to have courts carrying out this activity both at a highly professional level and with 
efficiency.
3
 The former requirement does not only incorporate  competent and impartial 
judicial activity, but also a well thought-out application of the law that takes the principles 
lying behind it seriously. Apart from court proceedings handled within reasonable time, the 
latter includes judicial activity that results in a final ruling on the merits and preferably is 
associated with few negative externalities. 
 
In both domestic and international specialist literature, organizational, managerial and 
constitutional law aspects come to the fore,
4
 this approach being reflected in comparative 
analyses carried out by various international organizations as well.
5
 Although these efforts 
also focus on important parameters, it is desirable on the author’s part to leave the simple 
listing of organizational and docket data behind. In this chapter, the direction marked by John 
Griffith in his book entitled The Politics of the Judiciary is going to be followed.
6
 In it, he 
established a connection between empirical data relating to the judicial system, the trends in 
judicial practice and the accomplishment of the judiciary’s social function. 
 
Since there is no room for a comprehensive description of the Hungarian judicial system and 
the mapping of each problem,
7
 the presentation of general data will be carried out by grouping 
them around two questions and in respect thereof. It is considered that efficiency and quality 
judgments as emphasized in the official strategy of the National Office for the Judiciary 
(hereinafter referred to as NOJ) encompass the two hubs that best reflect the current state of 
the Hungarian judicial system.
8
 
                                                          
3
 This objective is also embodied in the strategy of the National Judicial Office (NOJ), entrusted with the 
administration of courts. See http://birosag.hu/obh/strategia - 
4 
For the more important European initiatives, see http://www.iias-iisa.org/egpa/groups/permanent-study-
groups/psg-xviii-justice-and-court-administration/ and http://www.iacajournal.org/index.php/ijca. For books and 
studies see: Philip Langbroek: Quality Management in Courts and in the Judicial Organisations in 8 Council Of 
Europe Member States, Council of Europe Publishing CEPEJ studies, Strasbourg, 2011; Marco Fabri, Philip 
Langbroek (eds.): The Challenge of Change for Judicial Systems: Developing a Public Administration 
Perspective, IOS Press, Amsterdam, 2000; Gar Yein Ng: Quality of Judicial Organisation and Checks and 
balances, Intersentia, Antwerp, 2007. In Hungarian literature, this trend is represented by Fleck, Zoltán (ed.): 
Bíróságok mérlegen I-II., Pallas Páholy, Budapest, 2008; Hack, Péter - Majtényi, László - Szoboszlai, Judit: 
Bírói függetlenség, számonkérhetőség, igazságszolgáltatási reformok, Budapest, 
http://www.ekint.org/ekint_files/File/tanulmanyok/biroi_fuggetlenseg.pdf 
5
 In Europe, the two most renowned projects are  “The European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice” 
(CEPEJ) and the “EU Justice Scoreboard.” See http://www.coe.int/T/dghl/cooperation/cepej/default_en.asp and 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/scoreboard/index_en.htm  
6
 J. A. G. Griffith: The Politics of the Judiciary. Fontana Press, London, 1997.  
7
 For instance, the published work edited by Zoltán Fleck as referred to in Footnote 4 analyses and evaluates the 
Hungarian system of judicial bodies and its operation in two volumes totaling 750 pages.  
8
 With regard to the above and obvious limitations in volume, various and nonetheless significant areas are 
knowingly left untouched. They include the state of lay participation in dispensing justice, the unique position of 
3 
 
 
The guarantee of the standards and efficiency of the administration of justice may, on the one 
hand, be found in structural conditions, and, on the other, the characteristics of the staff. The 
legal background (legislation on court procedure, the constitutional situation of courts, 
structural regulation of courts, the scope and distribution of managerial and supervisory 
powers) and working conditions (e.g. the solidified institutional practice, workload, personal 
and physical infrastructure, budget developments) may be regarded as structural conditions. 
The personal conditions are characterized by classic judicial virtues: professional competence, 
experience, wisdom, impartiality and fairness. In order to get a realistic image of the 
functioning of the judicial system, both sides have to be taken into consideration when 
carrying out the examination.  
 
Within the entire judicial system, first and foremost, the operation of local courts (district 
courts) are analyzed since only a modicum of academic attention is paid to these courts while 
more than 90% of all court proceedings
9
 are initiated in them; thus, citizens most frequently 
come into contact with this level (and, on the other hand, appeal rate remains relatively low, 
around 20%).
10
   
 
With respect to the above described main function of courts, out-of-court procedures fall 
outside the field of vision of this study: they often lack a legal dispute on the merits (such as 
company proceedings, records of social organizations etc.); thus, they are barely taken into 
consideration as explanatory factors – should they exert any influence on the standards or 
efficiency of adjudicating lawsuits. 
 
Although the structural changes taking place in 2012 significantly affected the current 
situation, there is no intention to analyze them here.
11
  However, in certain instances where 
they possess explanatory power, they will be referred to, and, where appropriate, the year 
2010 or 2011 will be used as a base period for illustrative purposes of the changes. 
 
 
 
The efficiency of administering justice 
 
A dominant factor in the efficiency of justice administration is the number of the judiciary 
staff which has developed in the past three years as shown in Chart No. 1. For the purposes of 
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interpretation, it is advised to be aware of the fact that in the starting year of 2011, the number 
of judges was higher because in 2008 the National Judicial Council with its resolution No. 
197/2008 (IX. 25.) granted a temporary approval of extra statuses at the Metropolitan Court 
and the Budapest Environs Regional Court until 31 December 2011. The growth in the 
number of the judiciary since 2012 does not reveal much about the efficiency of the structure 
in itself; however, it can be stated that this number is high allowing comparison at EU level. 
Hungary ranks seventh place regarding the number of judges per 100,000 inhabitants.
12
 
Currently, there are no comparative data in relation to the number of the judicial staff that aids 
and partially relieves the workload of judges. Table No. 2 reveals that the number of court 
clerks has significantly been on the rise since 2011. As for court aids, there is stagnation, 
while the number of other administrative employees has dramatically increased.  
 
Table No. 1: the number of judges in Hungary (the author’s compilation based on NOJ annual reports) 
 Approved 
status Actual 
2011 2,914 2,871 
2012 2,875 2,767 
2013 2,910 2,807 
30/06/2014 2,910 2,815 
 
Table No. 2: the number of administrative employees in Hungary (the author’s compilation based on NOJ annual 
reports) 
Number of court clerks Approved Actual 
2011 614 605 
2012 767 732 
2013 767 777 
30/06/2014 776 764 
Number of court aids Approved Actual 
2011 359 256 
2012 359 239 
2013 359 260 
30/06/2014 348 252 
Number of other 
administrative 
employees Approved Actual 
2011 6,902 6,786 
2012 7,016 6,920 
2013 7,091 6,963 
30/06/2014 7,073 7,019 
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These figures correlate to the time needed to resolve a case: while sixth in civil and 
commercial divisions, Hungarian courts rank fourth in the administrative division among EU 
Member States.
13
 However, budgetary support for Hungarian courts is rather low compared to 
the general European level. Court expenditure per 100,000 inhabitants ranks Hungary merely 
at the 18
th
 place.
14
 All this is suggestive of efficient court operation; however, there are some 
factors that impede making reliable inferences. 
 
In international comparison, there exists no methodology as to when a case may be regarded 
as resolved. Does only resolving a case on the merits (judgment) or also technical/case 
management resolution count (e.g. transfer to another court or interruption in civil 
proceedings)? How easy or difficult it is in a legal system for a judge to “get rid of” a case 
(which e.g. include the legal prerequisites of rejection of claim without summons) also makes 
a difference. 
 
The result of a time series analysis seems to support the assumption based on which the 
period to resolve a case does not only depend on the number of judges and judicial 
employees, their working conditions and efforts. While the number of judges and judicial 
employees as well as the budgetary support of courts are constantly on the rise, the time 
needed to resolve a case at district court level in various divisions has shown significant 
variations over the years. As regards commercial cases, the clearance period followed the 
decrease in incoming cases, while the time needed to resolve cases in the civil division and in 
criminal proceedings reflects a slight, and in labor disputes a significant, increase (Chart No. 
1). 
 
Table No. 1: time needed to resolve cases at district court in four divisions (the author’s compilation based on 
NOJ annual reports) 
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One of the obvious explanatory reasons is the change in incoming cases, thus it is examined in 
Tables No. 3 and 4. 
 
Table No. 3: changes in the number of litigious incoming cases at local courts (district courts) (the author’s 
compilation based on NOJ annual reports)  
LITIGIOUS 
Year 
Civil 
proceeding
s 
Commerci
al 
proceeding
s 
Criminal 
proceedings 
Misdemeano
r 
proceedings 
Administrativ
e 
proceedings* 
Labor 
proceeding
s Total Total 
publicly 
prosecute
d 
2010 168,045 15,217 80,155 63,827 91,554 - 26,745 381,716 
2011 161,335 13,881 77,980 61,510 107,276 - 22,844 383,316 
2012 143,904 12,324 70,886 54,785 188,463 - 18,299 433,876 
2013 148,181 12,924  77,978 60,455 369,783 17,597 16,023 642,486 
2014 147,428 10,900  58,944 55,521 51,339 13,622 14,186 296,419 
 
Table No. 4: changes in the number of non-litigious incoming cases at local courts (district courts) (the author’s 
compilation based on NOJ annual reports)  
NON LITIGIOUS 
Year 
Civil and 
commercial 
non-
litigious 
Court 
execution 
cases 
Criminal 
non-
litigious 
cases in 
total 
Misdemeanor 
non-litigious 
Administrative 
non-litigious 
Labor 
non-
litigious Total** 
2010 375,981 - 64,265 28,915 - 4,346 473,507 
2011 64,328 - 62,186 26,547 - 1,860 154,921 
2012 61,521 - 58,838 11,651   1,501 133,511 
2013 62,138 134,734 59,012 4,647 4,611 1,232 131,640 
2014 62,019 118,522 78,074 311,655 4,386 1,322 575,978 
 
At first glimpse, it seems that variation was equally great between 2010 and 2014 with regard 
to incoming litigious and non-litigious cases. If, however, merely the “classic” court 
proceedings are examined (civil, commercial, labor and administrative proceedings as well as 
publicly prosecuted criminal proceedings), a considerable 10% or so decrease may be found 
in incoming cases (whereas in civil and criminal divisions the decrease exceeded 10%, the 
number of incoming cases was at a third as regards commercial cases and it dropped almost 
by half in respect to labor law cases). Although the number of misdemeanor proceedings 
temporarily grew in a drastic fashion (in 2012 and 2013), by 2014 it had dropped to slightly 
more than half of the 2010 figure.  
 
The number of non-litigious proceedings also requiring court resources and, to a certain 
extent, influencing the judges' workload, showed considerable variability in the examined 
period.  The volatile drop from 2010 to 2011 was due to the fact that payment warrant 
procedures were assigned to the notarial function. However, this did not result in the decrease 
in the working load since it was one of the simplest procedures that could be handled 
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practically in a mechanical fashion. From 2013 to 2014, just the opposite process took place, 
since misdemeanor case handling turned mainly into a simpler non-litigious procedure. 
 
The most plausible correlation between the number of incoming cases and the period of 
resolving a case would be the fact that the decreasing case amount induces a shorter resolving 
period because the judge may hear the same case in shorter intervals. Therefore, with the 
exception of the commercial division working with the smallest case number, the question is 
why a slight or a significant increase follows the considerable decrease in the number of 
cases. The answer may be found in the interaction of factors that are unknown
15
 (work 
organization issues, the changes of case structure etc.). Generally speaking, one may venture  
to state that changes in legislation resulting in the massive incoming of cases
16
 (e.g. in the 
misdemeanor division or in company cases relating to courts of law) do not improve 
predictable case management and, thus, resolving cases within reasonable time. 
 
It may be projected as a prognosis that if the decrease of incoming cases continues or it 
stabilizes at the present level, the timeliness of court proceedings will also continue to be 
improved. However, it would not be unwise to separate the technical resolving of cases and 
resolving cases on the merits in statistical figures in the future. Although it is true that not 
resolving cases on the merits may also be final and the case is not brought back to court, a 
court settlement or the judgment usually constitutes a reassuring decision for the parties. The 
general public will not judge a court based on the velocity with which it resolves the 
proceedings by rejection of a claim without summons, transferring the case or otherwise 
trying a case not on the merits, but based on the amount of time needed to resolve the legal 
dispute. This modification would also be productive because if this kind of registry was 
introduced in other EU Member States as well, comparison would then better reflect reality.
17
 
The current system encourages Member State court management to improve on the surface 
indicators if it expects to achieve good results, which is far simpler than achieving the 
thorough hearing of cases, yet within a reasonable time limit.
18
 
 
From this aspect, changes that have recently made the citizens’ right to apply to the courts 
difficult or fall behind in terms of reconcilability with the due process requirement may be 
assessed as a negative tendency. Two examples of such changes may be emphasized in the 
field of civil procedural law. 
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 There exists no accurate data as to the rate of replacing retired judges at a specific court following mandatory 
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The more serious effect may have been triggered by the price increase of court fees in 2011. 
The amount of court fees in procedures at first instance was maximized to HUF 1,500,000 and 
HUF 2,500,000 on appeal,
19
 and the conditions of granting exemption from costs have not 
been altered (per capita income not exceeding the minimum old-age pension and the lack of 
assets ensuring livelihood and, apart from that, if litigation costs endangered the livelihood of 
the litigant).
20
 It is a new regulation that 10% of the court fees will have to be paid even if the 
case was rejected without summons by the court.
21
 
 
Moreover, in 2011, concerning certain litigious cases, the legislator considerably extended the 
scope of litigation where legal representation is mandatory (e.g. copyright proceedings).
22
 In 
these cases, both the plaintiff and the defendant are obliged to have legal representation, 
otherwise their procedural statements will become invalid.
23
 This means a considerable 
burden on the litigants who may sometimes have only high hopes for the losing party to be 
solvent.
 24
 
 
Naturally, these conditions contribute to the decrease in incoming cases; however, they may 
discourage citizens to apply to the courts and encourage them to utilize other extralegal, even 
illegal means to enforce their claims.  
 
As far as criminal procedure is concerned, the tendency is that the legislator achieves 
accelerated proceedings by curtailing procedural safeguards. These include the option of the 
defendant not to appear at the hearing,
25
 the court may order witnesses to make a written 
testimony in lieu of oral examination
26
 and, unless an unforeseeable and insurmountable 
obstacle arises, it has become the obligation of the counsel for the defence to provide for a 
substitute should he not be present at a procedural action.
27
 
 
In addition to procedural means, a featured role is also attached to work organization within 
the court to reduce backlog of cases. Following the case transfer system that failed under 
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Sections 42 and 46 of Act XCIII of 1990 on court fees (Fees Act). Earlier, if the matter in dispute amounted to 
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defence as professionally as the counsel authorized by the defendant. Section 50(1e) of the Crim.Proc. Act 
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review by the Constitutional Court [Constitutional Court Ruling No 36/2013 (XII. 5.)], a 
practice evolved according to which judges are assigned from other courts to a court with 
surpassing backlog; however, they do not try the cases at the place of their assignment, but at 
their original courts – on behalf of the court which they have been assigned to.28 Although this 
method is undoubtedly an efficient means to distribute caseloads, it raises serious misgivings 
as well. On the one hand, in substance, it is smuggling back case transfer (since judges are 
assigned to try specific cases) and this way litigants and the accused are deprived of access to 
their legitimate court. On the other hand, the losing party or the convicted defendant will have 
to bear the extra costs that incurred due to the necessity to travel much further than the venue 
of the competent court (e.g. travelling expenses of witnesses). 
 
Based on the above, it may be established that prioritizing the improvement of time 
management efficiency over the prevalence of the quality requirement by the courts and 
leaders disposing over the entire operations of the legal system constitutes a serious risk 
factor. Naturally, the desire to have quantifiable results to show off before external and 
internal forums is understandable; however, the personal impressions of citizens coming into 
direct contact with courts also has to be balanced on the scales, which is a determining factor 
of the trust placed in the entire justice system. 
 
 
The conditions of quality justice  
 
Applied methods of assessing quality 
 
The objective assessment of the quality of judicial activities is one of the most challenging 
tasks for the internal management of justice as well as the political leaders responsible for the 
condition of the judiciary system. On the one hand, one has to respect the courts’ structural 
and the judges' personal independence and, on the other hand, it is rather difficult to evaluate 
a sequence of complex and deep thinking such as dispensing justice with exact methods.
29
 
Therefore, an indirect and mixed assessment method (based on a variety of indicators) is 
generally applied in the world’s different legal systems.30 What follows now is the analysis of 
the two applied methods within the Hungarian judicial system. One is the appeal ratio serving 
as a tool in the assessment of the operation of a specific court and the other is the personal 
assessment of the judges’ work.  
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 “... by assignment of the president of the National Judicial Office, 160 cases of the Budapest-Capital Regional 
Court of Appeal were resolved at the [Debrecen] Regional Court of Appeal in addition to their own tasks. Lajos 
Balla added that assignment shall continue, since between 1 September 2015 and 30 August 2016 the Debrecen 
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 The Finnish Rovaniemi Quality Project in the field is considered to be such a “pilot” study 
(http://www.courtexcellence.com/~/media/Microsites/Files/ICCE/QualityBenchmarksFinlandDetailed.ashx) 
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Appeal ratio 
 
The NOJ refers to issues of quality with the expression of “the soundness of dispensing 
justice” in its assessment practice. The NOJ’s surveillance over the appeal ratio has been 
traceable since 2012. Despite various practical problems that arise, this indicator may be 
regarded as a relatively reliable one because it does not utilize any internal standards of the 
judicial profession, but it is based on a court “user” assessment, therefore, it reflects upon the 
ultimate goal of the justice system. If the concerned parties in court proceedings are satisfied, 
one may not have any misgivings about the quality of dispensing justice.
31
  
 
Comparative data of sufficient weight in number are only available regarding civil cases. An 
international comparison would be extremely problematic since contrasting remedial 
regulations of different legal systems may distort the picture. To be able to interpret the 
Hungarian data, one should be aware that the 2011 and 2012 figures reflect the rate of appeals 
against all final decisions, while the 2014 chart only contains the appeals against judgments. 
This difference explains why  compared to 2012, the appeal ratio is almost twice as much in 
2014 (unfortunately, no data are available from 2013). Apart from this, the 2014 chart 
contains an aggregate of the appeal ratio of all non-criminal (and non-misdemeanor) cases, 
whereas these data were only available from 2011 and 2012 broken down according to case 
division. 
 
Chart No. 2: Appeal ratio at district courts in civil division and at administrative and labor courts in the first six 
months of 2014 (informative analysis published by the NOJ)
32
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 Apart from being satisfied with the first instance ruling, willingness to appeal may be influenced by the costs 
of the appellate proceedings (not only financial considerations, but also the invested time, the insecurity due to 
the pending situation, etc.). Nevertheless, the Rovaniemi Quality Project mentioned in Footnote 28 also applied 
this indicator. 
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http://birosag.hu/sites/default/files/allomanyok/statisztikai_adatok/a_birosagi_ugyforgalom_2014._i._felev_150d
pi.pdf 
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Chart No. 3: appeal ratio against final decisions at district court in civil division in 2011 and 2012 (Informative 
analysis published by the NOJ)
33
 
 
 
 
Chart No. 4: appeal ratio against final decisions at district court in commercial division in 2011 and 2012 
(Informative analysis published by the NOJ) 
 
 
Chart No. 5: appeal ratio against final decisions at district court in labor division in 2011 and 2012 (Informative 
analysis published by the NOJ) 
                                                          
33
 The source of charts No 3 to 5 is the same analysis: http://birosag.hu/sites/default/files/allomanyok/media-
lapszemle/stat-adatok/4_hosszu_elemzes_2012_kesz.pdf 
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By studying the 2014 figures, it is striking how considerable the variation is at each court of 
law. A well-founded inference for the causes might be concluded if data were available going 
back years; however, it is apparent from their comparison to the 2011 and 2012 data that there 
are courts of law where appeal ratios are steadily higher that in the case of others. 
 
One tendency is that district courts operating in the jurisdictional venue of the Metropolitan 
Court (metropolitan district courts) have a significantly high appeal ratio. The phenomenon 
may have various causes. It is possible that at courts with greater caseloads there is less time 
available for trying cases thoroughly, thus, clients are more dissatisfied with the final 
decisions.
34
 The high appeal data of the capital may be justified by the fact that there are a lot 
more cases pending there in proportion, behind which quite considerable financial or other 
interests lie. Also, the parties use every opportunity to enforce them regardless of the higher 
appeal fees.  
 
Another explanation lies in that apart from the Central Hungarian Region, there is a relatively 
small number of panels operating in courts of law in a specific division; therefore, 
establishing uniform practice is facilitated depending on which district courts may adjust 
themselves more easily. That is why the rate of successful appeal will be lower, which may 
weaken the litigants’ willingness to appeal. 
 
This explanation is contradicted by the fact that among the district courts operating at the 
venue of certain courts of law in the country, there is a considerable variation regarding 
appellate rates (the disparity amounted to as high as 80% between the counties with the 
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 The disproportionately great caseload of the Central Region has been a problem for years, which is reflected in 
the annual NOJ presidential reports as well. The situation is present in the latest 2014 reports as well: 
http://birosag.hu/sites/default/files/allomanyok/obh/elnoki-beszamolok/elnoki_beszamolo_2014.pdf 
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highest and lowest ratio in the first half of 2014). This situation may be traced back to two 
reasons to the best of our knowledge. On the one hand, it is possible that there are consistently 
and less consistently deciding second instance panels. Where appellate divisions function 
more consistently, the number of lodged appeals are smaller because of the above reason. The 
other possible reason may be that there really is a quality disparity among the justice quality 
of certain district courts and the higher appeal ratio, which constitutes one of the 
manifestations of the dissatisfaction of the clientele. 
 
Personal assessment 
 
The quality of dispensing justice, on the other hand, is ensured by the assessment of the work 
performed by specific judges. Pursuant to the statute in effect, as a general rule, judges are 
assessed within 3 years from their appointment and every 8 years following it.
35
  
 
During assessment, the competent chief justice of the division (or the person appointed by 
him) shall assess the judge’s substantive, procedural and case managerial law application and 
trial conduct practice. The annual activity of the judges shall be assessed in a statement based 
on caseload and activity-related data as well as second instance and review decisions, which 
shall be taken into consideration during overall assessment. Apart from this, a certain number 
of final judgments rendered by the judge shall be examined and panel justice notes prepared 
in the examined period shall be obtained (which is an assessment made by the chief justice of 
the appellate division reviewing appeals) as well as the opinion of the division chief justice 
competent in the legal area (if that person is different from the person conducting the 
examination). 
 
The judges’ professional activities are therefore assessed by their immediate professional 
superior who knows them personally as well as on whom their professional advancement is 
decisively dependent. This situation raises the problem that apart from the detailed assessment 
criteria (National Council of Justice Policy No 4 of 2011), the assessor’s personal opinion on 
the examined judge may play a role in the assessment. The subject of the assessment is 
encouraged to align his or her judicial activity predominantly to the viewpoint of the 
reviewing second instance panel as well as its judicial style (even regardless of his or her 
opposing professional convictions).  
 
This assessment method may just as easily lead to the atomization of legal practice. Since 
only a fragment of all incoming cases at district court level is reviewed by the Curia, the 
direction of legal practice conducted in the majority of cases is preponderantly determined by 
the conceptions of the specific judges employed at a specific court of law. The assessing 
judge is also from the ranks of the appellate judges reviewing the cases of the assessed judge; 
therefore, the judicial qualification mechanism may promote divergence of court of law 
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practice. This is especially true for questions of judicial activity that are typically not subject 
to review by the Curia (e.g. trial conduct style, evidence practice or even sentencing).
36
 
 
For the sake of excluding prejudice and exacting a uniform application of the law, an 
evaluation of the judicial activity should be carried out based on the best system during the 
quality examination of scientific publications. Therefore, assessment of judgments rendered 
by the judge could be trusted to professionally renowned fellow justices functioning at other 
courts of law, who would give their opinion on the particular judge’s work based on 
disidentified decisions (perhaps case documents). This way, disparities of legal practice 
within a country may be brought to the surface more easily apart from the objective 
assessment of the particular judge. This kind of blind peer-review system could bring full 
awareness to dispensing justice. 
 
Personal and structural factors influencing the quality of justice 
 
Personal composition of the judiciary staff 
 
High quality justice may not be guaranteed by even the best quality assurance system if the 
qualifications of the judges are unsuitable. Nevertheless, the professional preparedness of a 
particular judge and the degree of practicing judicial virtues cannot be measured. Thus, 
inferences may only be made from factors that suggest something about the judiciary. If, 
however, the legal sociological tenet is accepted that judges do not administer justice “in a 
vacuum” and certain sociological and social-psychological patterns may be applied to them, 
such an approach may be considered an asset. Among others, it may be examined as to what 
the age distribution, gender rate and financial situation of judges are, as well as to what extent 
a society’s ethnic minorities are represented in judicial bodies.37 
 
As for the Hungarian judiciary staff, few reliable data exist. One set is about the age 
distribution of judges. According to it, in 2012 more than half of the local judges trying the 
vast majority of cases were relatively young with less than 10 years of practice (Table No. 5). 
This ratio may explain in part, for example, the “prosecution-friendly” feature of the 
Hungarian criminal judicial practice (success rate of indictment has been 96-97% for years).
38
 
A younger and less experienced judge obviously listens more to the public prosecutor and 
respects the facts in the indictment rather than expose himself to the danger of being 
mistaken. Reducing the retirement age of judges from 70 to 62 years of age as of 1 January 
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 For the latter see Badó, Attila - Bencze, Mátyás: Területi eltérések a büntetéskiszabási gyakorlat szigorúságát 
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2012 increased the rate of these judges together with its consequences.
39
 Generally speaking, 
it can be established that it does not raise the standards of dispensing justice if a considerable 
part of the judiciary vanishes from the system from one day to the next with special regard to 
the fact that no research and experience supported that judges between 62 and 70 would have 
given a weaker performance in any field than their younger counterparts. 
 
Table No 5: Distribution of judges based on practice time in Hungary (the author’s own compilation based on 
annual NOJ reports) 
 0 to 10 years 
(total) 
over 10 years 
(total) 
0 to 10 years  
(at district courts) 
over 10 years  
(at district 
courts) 
2012 1,009 1,758 842 831 
2013 990 1,817 n/a n/a 
2014 1,087 1,728 n/a n/a 
 
It constitutes a further danger that, expressly or implicitly speaking, the current career chances 
encourage judges with outstanding abilities and ambition to attain the highest possible level in 
the judicial hierarchy. Thus, it is encoded in the operation of district courts that a large 
number of judges with short periods of practice will dispense justice,
40
 and they will have to 
tackle the problems of fact-finding, trial procedure and primary construction of legislation. In 
comparison, judges working at higher levels do not function or do so only within a very 
curtailed scope as fact-finding courts; in fact, they review the work of judges operating at a 
lower level.  
 
District court judges with little practice are further burdened with the fact that we live in a 
more and more complicated and specialized world, which is reflected in the composition of 
cases brought before court. At the inception of the modern justice structure (in the 19
th
 
century), an adequate legal expertise and a general experience in life was sufficient to 
adjudicate a typical case. However, nowadays, scores of legal problems reach the court which 
need specialist (e.g. economic, financial, accounting or IT) knowledge to understand their 
facts or establish liability. Judges are generally devoid of such knowledge and the Hungarian 
procedural law does not know concepts and procedures which could aid a judge’s work (the 
judge may appoint an expert; however, asking the questions directed to the expert would 
require appropriate specialist knowledge). Thus, it is encoded in the system that complex 
high-profile cases drag on and completely different decisions are reached at different levels of 
the judicial hierarchy, which may result in the weakening of trust in courts.
41
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The situation is rendered more precarious by the fact that district court judges have to proceed 
as sole judges while at second and third instance courts dispense justice in panels consisting 
of special judges. Due to the above-mentioned specificities of the first instance procedure, 
however, it is the first instance sole judge that has to pay attention to a variety of factors in a 
concurrent fashion, while the second and third instance procedure is less energy-consuming 
since the direction of the appeal determines the focus of the examination. With respect to all 
of this, it may seem a waste that the professional and political machinery responsible for the 
judicial system and procedural rules maintains the current structure. 
 
A more reasonable solution to the problem would mean that first instance courts would 
administer justice in panels consisting of three special judges, thus, the workload would be 
shared among them and there would be a lower risk of judges “overlooking” anything. 
However, the chances would increase that the appellate court should affirm the trial court 
decision, also triggering the depletion of appeals made. Therefore, at courts of second and 
third instance a smaller judiciary staff would seem sufficient and the consolidation of legal 
practice would also become more efficient.
42
 
  
The notion of the career judge is associated with this area. One may become a judge in the 
Hungarian judicial system and the typical way of becoming one is that one starts working at 
court as a court aid, then a court secretary and waits until the appointment arrives.
43
 It is not a 
requirement that one should acquire experience in other legal professions for at least a few 
months (e.g. with a lawyer or at another law enforcement body). However, a number of ex-
judges who are now attorneys state that if they returned to the judges’ bench, they would view 
some cases in a different way since they now have experience which they did not have 
previously while working as judges. With regard to the above, one should not discard the 
solution that would prescribe that judges  spend some time in other legal areas prior to 
appointment (mostly as attorneys). 
 
Apart from the length of time spent in judicial practice, another empirical fact that describes 
the composition of the judiciary staff relates to gender ratio. Prior to the regime change, one 
of the main problems of the profession was that it was thought to have become overly 
feminine. One reason for this was the predictability of the judicial profession compared to the 
hectic but more lucrative work of attorneys. Thus, working in the judiciary was particularly 
favored by women, as it allowed them to have a challenging profession, which at the same 
time did not force them to neglect their families, either. The situation has undergone some 
changes since the 90s; however, female dominance in the profession may still be observed. 
Almost 70% of judges working at local and county courts are women (according to relevant 
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data, it has been fluctuating between 68 and 70% for years).
44
 This rate is interesting because 
there may be substantial disparities in vision and commitment between a man and a woman in 
considering specific cases.
45
 The financial situation of judges and the quantity of cultural 
capital at their disposal may constitute a factor having an indirect effect on administering 
justice. In Hungary, no survey concerning the social strata from which members of the 
judiciary staff were recruited has been carried out since the regime change. That is why there 
are few sources at our disposal if the social background of Hungarian judges is brought under 
analysis. Perhaps it is due in part to the lack of empirical examinations that two polar opposite 
points of view – without any particular factual support – formed a few years ago regarding 
judges’ political views. Béla Pokol writes that the majority of the Hungarian judiciary staff 
have social-liberal inclinations,
46
 while Gáspár Miklós Tamás says that a considerable number 
of judges professes extreme right-wing views.
47
 
 
No survey has been carried out in Hungary concerning the financial situation of the judiciary 
staff that might permit a determination of their social status. Pursuant to a statutory 
provision,
48
 each judge shall provide a wealth declaration; however, it never reaches the 
public. The sole indicator which may give rise to assessing the judges’ financial situation is 
their remuneration. Generally speaking, it can be said that the judiciary staff was underpaid 
before the regime change. Measures were first taken to improve the situation in 1992, and the 
judicial remuneration was further increased by the 1997 justice reform.
49
 The next giant leap 
was taken by the more than 50% raise in remuneration in 2003 executed in two steps.
50
 With 
this, the Hungarian judiciary staff took a relatively prestigious place among the new Member 
States that acceded to the European Union on 1 May 2004.
51
 The remuneration of judges did 
not reach that of more renowned attorneys; however, the steady and considerable income 
compared to other state employees now ensured an appropriate livelihood.  
 
However, the basic judicial salary has only increased by 11.72% in the past 10 years.
52
 In 
2015, the gross salary of a new judge appointed to the lowest rank of the judicial hierarchy 
amounts to HUF 430,760 which, reaching the highest step (if he or she does not receive any 
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 According to the 2014 NOJ presidential report, the rate of women among the judges was 68% 
(http://birosag.hu/sites/default/files/allomanyok/obh/elnoki-beszamolok/elnoki_beszamolo_2014.pdf). 
Unfortunately, the report did not include gender ratio broken down to court level and specific case divisions. 
45
 See Footnote 35. However, based on the declaration of a psychologist expert, the hiatus lies somewhere else: 
there is a more marked difference in the judicial practice between judges without any children and judges who 
have children. Childless judges have no established opinions on how to raise a child and are more open to 
different child-rearing methods, especially of those being in different social-financial situations. 
46
 Pokol, Béla: A bírói hatalom. Századvég Kiadó, Budapest, 2003. p 46 
47
 http://www.magyarhirlap.hu/Archivum_cikk.php?cikk=74888&archiv=1&next=20 
48
 Section 197 of the Judges’ Status Act 
49
 See Badó, Attila - Bóka, János: Európa kapujában. Bíbor Kiadó, Miskolc, 2002. [page number] 
50
 http://24.hu/belfold/2002/10/09/megegyezes_szuletett_biroi_fizetesek/ 
51
 Gross judicial average wage was higher only in Slovenia among the newly acceded former “Eastern block” 
countries. See 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CEPEJ%282006%29Evaluation&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&B
ackColorInternet=eff2fa&BackColorIntranet=eff2fa&BackColorLogged=c1cbe6 
52
 http://www.mabie.hu/sites/mabie.hu/files/letp%C3%A1lya%20I-II.r%C3%A9sz-1.pdf 
18 
 
managerial title supplement, or is not appointed to a higher level court), will have topped at 
HUF 724,460 by the end of his or her career. It is worth comparing the 2014 gross average 
salary of university graduate employees to these figures, which is HUF 477,567.
53
 It is no 
coincidence that in the 2012 CEPEJ rating the Hungarian gross judicial average salary 
remains the penultimate one among EU Member States.
54
  
 
Thus, the starting judicial salary may not be deemed really appealing compared to other 
professions. Another non-negligible circumstance is that one may receive judicial 
appointment only after turning 30; therefore, one may have to make do with an income that is 
inferior to a staring judicial income for 5 to 7 years or even for a longer period following 
graduation from university. 
 
In addition, the unfavorable payment status involves two risk factors. One of them is the 
danger of negative selection: the responsible judicial activity of practicing public power that 
also involves a serious intellectual challenge would require that only the most outstanding 
person should choose the judicial profession. However, with such remunerative conditions, 
the judicial profession will become less and less attractive, especially in regions where the 
graduate average income is inherently higher (the Central Hungarian Region and the Western 
Trans-Danubian Region).  
 
The other serious danger is that the risk of corruption will be enhanced. An underpaid judge 
deciding in a high-profile case is only protected by his or her own personal honesty from 
illegitimate attempts at influence in proceedings where classic procedural and organizational 
solutions (public accessibility of the hearing, adversarial process, corrective mechanisms and 
joint justice) do not prevail or do so only in a limited way (company proceedings, 
prolongation and review of custody pending trial, winding-up proceedings, etc.). A 
responsible legislator should struggle to reduce the chance of corruption with every means 
possible. One side of this would include a salary commendable to the profession and the 
accompanying responsibility. 
 
Obviously, one may not establish a direct correlation; however, it is a thought-provoking fact 
that criminal prosecution was initiated against three judges charged with bribery. One final 
criminal conviction has been rendered so far.
55
     
 
 
Conclusion 
This study attempted an evaluation of the Hungarian judicial system. It is considered 
that efficiency and quality judgments encompass the two hubs that best reflect the 
current state of the judicial system; however, any method suitable for international 
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comparison only remains limited due to differences in the judicature of national legal 
systems. The disclosed data reflect an ideal state in some points and without any 
background information they show the image of an exceptionally efficient justice system. 
That Hungary ranks seventh place regarding the number of judges per 100,000 
inhabitants at EU level may be considered so. Also, an efficient justice system is reflected 
in the end period of litigation: while sixth in civil and commercial divisions, Hungarian 
courts rank fourth in administrative division among EU Member States. These data 
seem excellent especially in light of the budgetary support of Hungarian courts being 
rather low as compared to the general European level. Court expenditure per 100,000 
inhabitants merely ranks Hungary in the 18th place. This study pointed out that the 
above indicators are misleading and, in order to resolve this, the only solution would 
involve the establishment of a Pan-European uniform assessment methodology. The 
current system encourages Member State court management to improve on the surface 
indicators if it expects to achieve good results, which is far simpler than achieving the 
goal that cases be heard thoroughly, yet within a reasonable time limit. 
It is a more serious problem that political leaders may “sell” the curtailing of 
institutional and personal autonomy of the judicature as a necessary step towards 
creating a high standard, efficient and client-friendly administration of justice. With 
regard to this context, what may be forecast is that strong pressure will be placed on 
courts in Hungary in the future in order to show continuous improvement concerning 
measurable parameters.   
One of the means of political pressure may lie in the regulation of the levels of judicial 
remuneration. It was pointed out that the lack of financial acknowledgement of 
Hungarian judges constitutes a realistic danger of prejudice to judicial independence. In 
the 2012 CEPEJ rating the Hungarian gross judicial average salary remains the 
penultimate one among EU Member States. This, however, implies the realistic 
possibility of negative selection and corruption whose signs already loom on the horizon.  
 
